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Abstract
The reductionist trend of equalizing sustainable development with CO2 control
needs to be reversed — notwithstanding the significance of climate change.
Conventional, ‘compartmentalized’ data systems impede an integrated vision and
treatment of the paradigm. New accounts and balances focus on the interaction
between environment and economy. ‘Greened’ national accounts measure econo-
mic sustainability in terms of (produced and natural) capital maintenance;
balances of material flows assess ecological sustainability as the dematerialization
of production and consumption. Both concepts aim to preserve environmental
assets. They differ however with regard to the scope, strength and evaluation of
sustainability. First results for Germany indicate weak sustainability of the
economy, owing to an increasing capital base. Strong sustainability is not in sight,
though, since material throughput has not been reduced sufficiently. An ‘Alliance
for Sustainable Development’ is proposed to implement and sustain the paradigm.
Keywords: Dematerialization; capital maintenance; sustainability; environmental
accounting, eco-tax, alliance for sustainable development
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1 Sustainable development — the great hypocrisy
The 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro produced the magic wand of ‘sustain-
able development’ for attaining socioeconomic development while safeguarding
the environment. Government, industry and civil society readily embraced the
concept. However, the opacity of the concept1 rather than genuine consensus is
probably the reason for this embracement. Industry sees sustainable development
as an opportunity for innovation and new markets; governments proclaim it as a
means of soothing ‘green’ objections to economic growth; and certain groups of
civil society use it as a weapon against globalization and merciless competition.
Disillusion spread rapidly five years after the Rio Earth Summit, at the Rio+5
conference. The special session of the United Nations General Assembly achieved at
best, in the words of its President Razali Ismail, an “honest appraisal“ of meagre
progress.2 Most governments did not commit to implementing the Summit’s Agenda
21 and its conventions. One example are the meagre results of the recent negotiations
on the Climate Convention’s Kyoto Protocol. The real hypocrisy is revealed, though,
in a general ‘unwillingness to pay’. Contrary to the North’s promises in Rio, new and
additional resources for the implementation of Agenda 21 did not come forth (with
notable exceptions), and official aid has generally decreased. The Rio Summit’s high-
flying expectations for sustainable development have thus met with disappointment
and frustration. Yet, with the advent of the first global summit on sustainable
development (Johannesburg, 26 August to 4 September 2002) nobody dares to speak
about the unthinkable — the possible demise of the paradigm.
A renewed focus on economic growth, thinly veiled by sustainability rhetoric,
reveals indeed a changed perception of sustainable development. Industrialized
countries, with the acquiescence of most developing nations, relegate the
presumably integrative concept to weak environmental ministries and agencies. At
national and international conferences on sustainable development representatives
of economic or financial departments are conspicuously absent. ‘It’s the economy,
stupid’3 is back on the agenda of growth- and wealth-oriented policy makers.
                                                 
1 A good example is the popular Brundtland definition of sustainable development as the
satisfaction of current and future generations’ needs (WCED 1987, p. 43): the definition
specifies neither the needs nor the timeframe for their satisfaction, nor a particular role for the
environment.
2
 See for assessments of the results of Rio+5, Osborn and Bigg (1998).
3
 The leitmotiv of former President Bush’s election campaign.
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Box 1: A reductionist view:
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
⇓
ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY
⇓
CLIMATE
PROTECTION
⇓
CO2 control
Germans, for instance, discovered the stock market and its promise of ever-
increasing riches with enthusiasm (albeit currently dampened by a world-wide
recession). As to environmental concerns,
environmental protection is believed to
control effectively most emissions, or
these concerns are considered a matter of
uncertainty like climate change and its
long-term effects. Remaining problems
ought to be taken care of ‘automatically’
by the current transition to a non-material
knowledge-based service society.4 The
result is a reductionist view of sustainable
development (Box 1), equating develop-
ment with economic growth, environment
with climate change and sustainability
with some half-hearted safeguarding
against global warming.
What is overlooked, of course, is that
• much of the rich countries’ environmental successes are achieved on the back
of developing nations by depleting their natural resources and exporting dirty
industries — in other words by importing sustainability
•  services and information technology still require large amounts of energy
inputs and material infrastructure, and
•  risks of new (notably genetics) and old (nuclear energy) technologies still
loom large — as do other concerns such as global nitrogen fertilization,
natural disasters, hazardous chemical production, soil degradation and
regional wars.5
The reductionist trend needs to be exposed and reversed. Otherwise we end up again
in the compartmentalization trap where each agency pursues its own idiosyncratic
strategy, with the environment languishing on the sidelines. Three steps are essential
for facilitating the return of sustainable development to national and international
policy agendas. First, the paradigm needs to be operationalized by means of
integrative indicators. Second, these indicators should be used in formulating and
monitoring sustainability policies. Third, the key players in the sustainability
conundrum, i.e. the stake- and shareholders in economic activities, should be brought
together in what could be a ‘Great Alliance’, as suggested in section 5.
                                                 
4 These Kuznets-curve expectations (discussed and largely refuted in a special edition of
Ecological Economics (25/2, 1998) are usualy not stated explicitly but seem to sustain recent
calls in European countries for delaying or abolishing the modest eco-taxes on energy
consumption for the sake of economic growth and employment (see also section 5, below).
5 As identified by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in its GEO-2000 report
<www.unep.org/geo2000/english/0250.htm>.
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2 Unveiling wealth: measuring material
throughput and natural capital consumption
2.1 Proliferation of indicators
It is common knowledge that the ‘quantitative’ measures of economic
performance such as the values of production and consumption provide a distorted
picture of human wealth and welfare. These measures disregard non-marketed and
undesirable side effects of human activity. Early search for alternative indicators
of the ‘quality’ of human life in the 1970s (OECD, 1973) failed, however, in
reaching a consensus on the main qualitative elements of human welfare. The
results were large and widely differing lists of social indicators which overlapped
in scope and coverage, whose significance for assessing human well-being was far
from clear, and which used different units of measurement and were thus difficult
to compare, aggregate and prioritize (Bartelmus, 1980, pp. 47-50). It is no surprise
that these indicator sets were unable to dethrone the leading economic aggregates,
GDP, income, employment and consumption, as the main compasses for national
policy making.
The late 1980s and 1990s saw a new focus on the negative side of the human
quality of life, but this time considering the economic policy causes of
environmental degradation and depletion (WCED, 1987). Rather than attempting
to measure the unmeasurable, i.e. human happiness or well-being, the idea was to
lift the veil of monetary value from economic indicators, notably GDP and its
components (Leipert, 1989; Brown, 1993; Daly 1996), to reveal their flaws of
•  including ‘defensive expenditures’ on goods and services that do not
contribute to human welfare
• excluding goods and services provided outside the monetized economy
•  neglecting (negative) environmental externalities and their social cost,
generated by production and consumption
•  neglecting inequities in the distribution of environmental impacts, and of
income and wealth in general.
These flaws pose indeed a risk of setting the economy on a non-sustainable path
of growth and development. After all, economic development is to improve the
human standard (or quality) of living. Attempts at capturing all the largely
negative social and environmental effects of economic activity created again long
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lists of environmental and sustainability indicators (Bartelmus, 1994b; OECD,
1994; United Nations, 1996; Moldan, Billharz and Matravers, 1997; European
Commission, 1999). Of course, these indicators face the same problems of
comparability and aggregation as the social indicator sets of 20 years ago.
Other more compound indices sought to convey a broader picture of economic
welfare, genuine progress or human development. An eclectic deduction of
‘regrettables’ (defensive expenditures, environmental externalities, etc.) and
addition of ‘desirables’ (leisure, non-market outputs) and inconsistent concepts,
classifications and valuation mixes are major flaws of the Measure of Economic
Welfare (Nordhaus and Tobin, 1972), and the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI)
(Cobb, Halstead and Rowe, 1995); the selection of indicators and the equal
weighting of unequal and correlated issues by the Human Development Index
(HDI) (UNDP, annual) obscure the meaning of this index (Bartelmus, 2001b,
p 23).
Two systemic approaches seem now to be more successful in developing
integrative measures of the environment-economy interface. They are
•  the physical Material Flow Accounts (MFA), developed at the Wuppertal
Institute and widely applied in industrialized nations (Bringezu, 1997;
Adriaanse et al., 1997; Matthews et al., 2000: Eurostat, 2001) and
• the physical and monetary System of integrated Environmental and Economic
Accounting (SEEA) of the United Nations (1993, 2000).
2.2 Material flow accounting
The measurement of flows of materials through the economy is to assess the
pressure of such throughput on the carrying capacity of natural systems. The
approach is based on thermodynamic laws of conservation and entropy of energy
and matter.6 The MFA make use of these physical laws by applying them to an
economic region or political territory like a country. The horizontal view of
Figure 1 illustrates how material flows enter the national economy (dotted circle),
from the environment and abroad, and leave it as exports and residual ‘outputs’ of
waste and emissions. During a particular accounting period some material inputs
may accumulate in long-lasting fixed assets or inventories. This accumulation can
be interpreted as — physical — growth of the economy (see section 4.1).
                                                 
6 It is the merit of Georgescu-Roegen (e.g. 1979) to extend the entropy law beyond energy to
matter (“matter matters”), thus providing the rationale for measuring the environment-economy
interaction in material and energy flow accounts.
Dematerialization and Capital Maintenance: Two Sides of the Sustainability Coin 9
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment, Energy
Figure 1: Environmental (national) accounting and material flows.
Various indicators of material input and output are to measure the environmental
impacts from material throughput (Schmidt-Bleek, 1994; Adriaanse et al., 1997;
Matthews et al., 2000). Among others, the MFA assess the Total Material
Requirement (TMR) on the input side of material flow balances and the Total
Domestic Output (TDO) on the output side. The TMR, in particular, is to measure
the overall environmental pressure from natural resource use by adding up the
inputs of raw materials in tonnes, including hidden flows or ‘ecological
rucksacks’.7 The purpose of such ‘weighting by weight’ is to capture all kinds of
actual and potential environmental impacts and welfare effects. In this manner, a
precautionary approach is applied which is to permit anticipation of potentially
disastrous and largely unknown environmental effects (Hinterberger et al., 2000).
                                                 
7
 Ecological rucksacks are defined as “the sum of all materials which are not physically included
in the economic output under consideration, but which are necessary for production, use,
recycling and disposal“ (Spangenberg et al. 1999, p. 15). Other aggregations use area equi-
valents for assessing environmental pressure on surrounding territories, or even the planet, like
the Ecological Footprint (Wackernagel and Rees, 1996) or apply energy units such as the
Exergy or Emergy Measures (Odum, 1996). Much of the following argumentation with regard
to the use and usefulness of the MFA aggregates applies to these indicators as well.
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On the output side, TDO measures the turnover and distribution (by environ-
mental sink) of total waste and residuals during the accounting period. More
importantly — as environmental pressure is already measured by TMR — the
selective measurement of particularly noxious substances can be used to assess
the ‘detoxification’ of selected production and consumption processes.
2.3 Greening the national accounts
The purpose of material flow accounting is to measure the physical ‘metabolism’
of the economy (Ayres, 1989) or even the society (Fischer-Kowalski, 1998).
Disturbances of this metabolism affect the ‘health’ of society — literally with
regard to human well-being and more generally with regard to the quality of
natural systems. Clearly, the ‘smooth’ functioning of the economy depends on the
provision of natural resource flows and environmental services of waste disposal.
However, the metabolistic analysis of physical flows cannot by itself make any
evaluation of the smoothness of economic performance, unless in extreme cases
where a physical breakdown alerts to a corresponding economic one.
It is in fact the very nature of economics to perform such an evaluation, taking
scarcities in the availability of raw materials and other factors of production into
account and confronting consumer preferences (for goods and services) with the
cost of these scarcities. An exclusive focus on the physical basis of the economy
treats the economy like an insatiable black hole which  gobbles up natural
resources and regurgitates these resources as waste and emissions. This may be a
natural reaction to the above-described reductionist mood of societies but does not
do justice to the evaluative capacity of the economic system. On the other hand,
conventional economists have holed up in their own hole by considering non-
priced environmental impacts as an ‘externality’.
The basic idea of ‘greening’ the national accounts has therefore been to overcome
this mutual black-holing by
•  applying the economic accounting concepts and classifications to environ-
mental assets and asset changes in order to mould them into the stock and flow
system of the economy, and
• using the compatibility thus achieved to price and cost the physical stocks and
flows so as to make them comparable to the economic concepts of income,
production and wealth.
To this end, the SEEA was designed as a ‘satellite’ system of the world-wide
adopted System of National Accounts (SNA) (United Nations et al., 1993).
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Counterpart tabulations in different ‘versions’ of the original SEEA8 ensure the
comparability of physical and monetary stocks and flows.
The modification of conventional economic accounting indicators sets out from
viewing nature as an additional, non-produced production factor. Using up this
production factor reduces the availability of natural resource inputs, and the
supply of environmental services of safe absorption of waste and pollutants. In
analogy to the consumption of produced (‘fixed’) capital, natural capital
consumption can thus be seen as a further cost element which, when ignored,
contributes to the non-sustainability of economic performance. The vertical view
of Figure 1 illustrates the role of capital consumption as a measure of loss of
capital stocks in the balance sheets of the national accounts.
The SEEA extends these accounts by incorporating natural capital assets in the
asset accounts and by additionally costing their consumption in the flow (supply
and use) accounts. The accounting for natural capital use extends thus the
sustainability criterion of costing capital consumption, already built into the
conventional indicators of national income, net product and net capital formation,
to natural capital. Modified aggregates of Environmentally-adjusted net Domestic
Product (EDP), Value Added (EVA), Capital Formation (ECF), Environmental
Cost (EC) and wealth in Economic and Environmental Assets (EEA) are the result
(Bartelmus, 2001a, Appendix).
Note that such accounting focuses on the immediate interaction between the
environment and the economy in terms of natural capital services for production
and consumption. Further welfare effects on health and other social (cultural,
ethical) values are thus not accounted for since they are difficult to measure and
near-impossible to value in money terms at the national level. This is in line with
the basic objectives of national accounting, namely to assess economic
performance rather than welfare.
                                                 
8 The so-called London Group of national accountants has been revising the SEEA which is
expected to be re-issued in 2002. Unfortunately, the new ‘system’ seems to have abandoned
the original compatibility for a set of difficult-to-link modules and methodologies for physical
and monetary accounting. See for the current status of the revision process,
<http://ww2.statcan.ca/citygrp/london/publicrev/intro.htm>. In contrast, the Operational
Manual of the SEEA (United Nations, 2000) retains full consistency with the SNA and hence a
better capacity for compiling modified ‘green‘ economic indicators. See for a review of the
SEEA approach, Bartelmus (2001a).
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3 Dematerialization versus capital maintenance
Table 1 gives an overview of the objectives, strategies, measures and policies of
two fundamental — ecological and economic — notions of sustainability.
Applying the above-described accounting tools to the interface between economy
and environment generates operational (quantifiable) concepts of
•  ecological sustainability as ‘dematerialization’ of economic activity, which
reduces the pressure on the carrying capacities of natural systems, and
• economic sustainability as ‘capital maintenance’ which is to ensure continuing
economic growth after taking the consumption of both produced and natural
assets into account.
3.1 Dematerialization: attaining ecological sustainability
Reducing material throughput is to keep the pressure on natural carrying
capacities at tolerable levels. The strategy of dematerialization is to decrease raw
material inflows into and accumulation within the economy, and outflows of
wastes and toxic substances into the environment. Of course, the latter, i.e. the
reduction of outflows, can be directly tackled by environmental policy and is
therefore added in the table as a supplementary ‘detoxification’ strategy. The main
means of attaining dematerialization is the increase of ‘resource productivity’,
measured in particular by the ratio of GDP over TMR. It is generally held that
such technological improvement of the ‘eco-efficiency’ of production needs to be
supported by greater ‘sufficiency’ in consumption in order to avoid or reduce
rebound effects from efficiency gains: Lower costs and prices can be expected to
stimulate production and consumption through savings in resource use (Sachs,
1995).
Standards or norms introduce ecological sustainability criteria into the
dematerialization analysis by asking: how much pressure is tolerable? They
specify permissible levels of the use of materials in economic activity. Best
known is probably the Factor 4 standard (von Weizsäcker, Lovins and Lovins,
1997) which calls for halving total material input into the economy while
doubling wealth and welfare. At the global level, Factor 4 is derived from the goal
of long-term ecological equilibrium of the planet. Planetary equilibrium in turn is
operationalized by the normative concept of ‘environmental space’, defined as
equal access to environmental services by everybody (Weterings and Opschoor,
1992). Under current production and consumption patterns, Factor 4 can be
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translated into a Factor 10 for industrialized countries. The assumption is that an
equal environmental space should be reached by all in about 50 years while
permitting a limited increase of material use in developing countries (Schmidt-
Bleek, 1994, p. 168).
Factor 4 points to the strategic objective of decoupling the use of materials from
— unavoidable or desirable — economic growth. Recent statements by some of
the Factor 4 protagonists and by those advocating even higher factors seem to
dissociate themselves from the ‘double-wealth’ part of Factor 4. In their view,
Factor 4 is more of a general guard-rail (Hinterberger et al., 2000) or leitmotiv
(Bringezu, in prep.) to steer policy makers in the right direction than an actual
target for attaining sustainable development.
Table 1: Operational concepts and policies of sustainability
Economic
Sustainability
Ecological
sustainability:
dematerialization/
detoxification
produced and natural
capital maintenance
non-declining welfare
Rationale Reducing throughput
below carrying
capacities
Sustaining economic
growth
Sustaining qualitative
development
Strategy Decoupling economic
growth  from
environmental pressure
Maximizing economic
growth while keeping
produced and natural
capital intact
Maximizing quality of
life
Accounting
tools
Material Flow Accounts
(MFA), Physical Input-
Output Table (PIOT)
System for integrated
Environmental and
Economic Accounting
(SEEA)
(ad hoc compilation)
Key indicators TMR, TDO,  resource
productivity:
GDP/TMR
‘Green’ economic
aggregates: EDP, EVA,
ECF
GPI, HDI
Strength of
sustainability
Strong: reduction of
material flows to meet
sustainability standards
Weak: overall capital
maintenance with
substitution between
produced and natural
capital
(not defined, beyond
generic management
rules)
Policy
instruments
Regulation and standard
setting (Factor X), fiscal
disincentives for
material inputs, support
to materialsaving
innovation
Use of green indicators
and variables in economic
analysis and policy;
market instruments of
environmental cost
internalization
(spreading antigrowth
sentiment)
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Factor 4 points to the strategic objective of decoupling the use of materials from
— unavoidable or desirable — economic growth. Recent statements by some of
the Factor 4 protagonists and by those advocating even higher factors seem to
dissociate themselves from the ‘double-wealth’ part of Factor 4. In their view,
Factor 4 is more of a general guard-rail (Hinterberger et al., 2000) or leitmotiv
(Bringezu, in prep.) to steer policy makers in the right direction than an actual
target for attaining sustainable development.
3.2 Economic sustainability: maintaining growth and welfare
Environmental economists have investigated the welfare relevance of environ-
mental protection expenditures and environmental degradation and destruction in
models of optimal (maximum) economic growth. They define sustainable
development as non-declining welfare (or constant per-capita consumption as a
measure of inter-generational equity), taking environmental damage and loss of
natural resources into account (Solow, 1974; Hartwick, 1977; Dasgupta and
Mäler, 1991). However, these abstract notions and models stand little chance of
implementation. More practical-minded scholars resorted to simpler indices of
economic welfare or human development. As discussed above, even the indices
face insurmountable problems of welfare and damage measurement and valuation.
Table 1 indicates (in the last column) that these indices fail in supporting concrete
policy measures beyond alerting to some deviation between presumed well-being
and economic growth. In the words of the GPI authors the objective is to “blast
away the obfuscating polemics of growth — and the devious politics that go along
with it” (Cobb, Halstead and Rowe, 1995, p. 72).
Rather than assessing damage and utility from economic activity, environmental-
economic accounting focuses on the cost side of the environment-economy
interaction. Economists consider the accumulation of real (non-financial) capital
as the ‘engine’ of economic growth. This engine drives future production and
consumption and needs to be repairment and replacement to sustain economic
activity. This is because capital stocks are used up in production and ultimately
disposed of as waste. Only part of these changes in stocks, namely their
permanent loss, beyond repair and regeneration, is considered as non-sustainable
and therefore costed as capital ‘consumption’ in the SEEA. Economic
sustainability is thus simply the extension of the conventional economic notion of
long-term capital maintenance to natural assets. In this manner, future growth
potentials are more accurately determined, since the cost of natural capital
destruction is accounted for. Environmentally-adjusted (net) capital formation
(ECF) indicates thus a nation’s ability to generate new capital, and hence future
growth, after taking produced and natural capital consumption into account.
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At the micro-economic level of households and enterprises, future environmental
impacts could be avoided or mitigated by budgeting additionally for the cost of
natural capital consumption and using these cost allocations for capital
replacement. ‘Market instruments’ (eco-taxes, effluent charges, tradable-emission
and natural-resource-use permits, environmental protection subsidies) are to bring
about such ‘cost internalization’ and spending by economic agents. At the same
time, governments might use the revenues from these instruments for investments
in natural capital increase or enhancement (see Box 3, below).
3.3 A physical-monetary dichotomy
The focus on physical targets and indicators by environmentalists on the one
hand, and on full-cost (including environmental costs) pricing and investment by
economists has unfortunately given rise to a highly charged dispute between the
two camps. The roots of this dissent lie in a different world-view of economists
and environmentalists.9  Economists rely on individual preferences, expressed or
simulated in markets (and market prices) to value economic products and
environmental assets and services. In contrast, environmentalists consider the
environment as an indivisible (public) good on whose value markets should not
have say.
The physical-monetary dichotomy is also present in the accounting systems and
can therefore be investigated in more operational terms. Table 1 presents this
dichotomy with the MFA and the physical input-output tables (PIOT) on the
physical side and the SEEA and welfare indices on the monetary side.10
Both MFA and SEEA, and their respective concepts of dematerialization/
detoxification and capital maintenance, deal with the input and output sides of
material flows. The MFA remain however in the physical assessment stage,
whereas the SEEA changes physical units into cost, in accordance with national
accounts conventions. Does this mean that their physical and monetary
assessments are two sides of the same sustainability coin?
At the most generic level, dematerialization and capital maintenance appear
indeed to have a similar sustainability objective: namely the long-term
                                                 
9
 This crude distinction betweeen environmentalist views of the human environment and
mainstream (neoclassical) economic approaches to the environment-economy interface is, of
course, a simplification of existing schools of thought. For instance, “ecological economists”
can be placed somewhere in between. See for a more detailed discussion of the polarization of
ecological and environmental economists, Bartelmus (2000).
10
 Note that the SEEA, and in particular its revised draft version, also account fully for their
physical counterparts. PIOTs, which include flows of materials and pollutants, were pioneered
in Germany (Stahmer, Kuhn and Braun 1998).
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preservation of environmental assets and their source and sink functions. Their
measures differ, however, when looking more closely at their definition, scope
and envisaged uses. Besides more technical deviations of MFA categories from
SNA/SEEA standards and definitions (Bartelmus with Vesper, 2000),
dematerialization
•  appears to be less integrative, with regard to the environment-economy
interface, than capital maintenance: It has to resort to calculating ratios of
resource productivity or material intensity, whereas green accounting
indicators (EDP, ECF) subtract directly environmental cost from conventional
economic aggregates
•  evaluates environmental impacts and sets corresponding policy priorities
‘exogenously’ by governmental or expertocratic fiat as sustainability
standards, notably Factor X. Such normative evaluation is avoided in principle
by environmental costing, since the deduction of these costs obtains simply a
‘netter’ value of production, without double-counting (depreciation) costs11
• implies intra- and inter-generational equity of equal access to environmental
services by the present and future generations, as a consequence of such
standard setting, whereas natural capital valuation discounts future capital uses
according to the preferences of the current generation’s investors12
• combines the impacts caused directly by activities of a particular nation with
those caused indirectly through imports (and hence borne by other nations).
This permits the assessment of total physical pressure from the supply and
demand side of economic activity; in contrast, the rigorous ‘cost’ definition of
the national accounts applies a strict cost-caused concept to avoid double-
costing and inconsistent valuation mixes when summing up environmental
impacts
•  is easier to measure and interpret than environmental cost and environ-
mentally-adjusted economic indicators. But such ease has its price: While
depletion and degradation costs represent the — non-sustainable — permanent
loss of natural capital, MFA indicators do not allow for the regeneration of
natural resources and absorptive sinks
•  is more anticipatory: adding up material inflows and movements is a
precautionary approach which alerts to actual and potential, and in fact
                                                 
11
 Note however that the more practical (than damage valuation) maintenance costing of the
SEEA has sometimes to resort to costing the compliance with environmental quality standards
(as proposed by Baumol and Oates, 1971). This is the case when total avoidance costing would
lead to excessive – as compared to economic benefits of a production or consumption process
— cost levels.
12
 Notably when calculating the ‘net present value’ of natural resource stocks. See for a dis-
cussion of the different valuation techniques applied in environmental accounting, Bartelmus
(1998).
Dematerialization and Capital Maintenance: Two Sides of the Sustainability Coin 17
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment, Energy
frequently unknown, environmental impacts which in the final analysis are all
the result of natural resource exploitation. This is also the justification for
using a ‘directionally safe’ (towards sustainable development) aggregate
obtained by a relatively crude weighting by weight of environmental impacts.
Dematerialization and capital maintenance: two sides of the same coin? The
answer is ‘yes’, but only as far as the most generic goal of environmental
sustainability is concerned. Otherwise, there are important differences in the scope
of the sustainability concept, the strength of the underlying sustainability notions,
the implied environmental risk assessment, the evaluation (weighting) of
environmental impacts, and pertinent strategies and policies. Both notions also
focus on the sustainability of economic performance or growth, at the expense of
further social and institutional dimensions of a sustainable development concept.
Sustainable development would have to be defined in terms of a normative
framework for non-economic goals of development (Bartelmus 1994a, p. 73).
The following is to illustrate and evaluate these generic arguments by applying the
assessment tools of MFA and SEEA to Germany.
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4 Germany: a sustainable economy?
4.1 A far cry from Factor 4?
As already mentioned, the purpose of reducing material flows is to delink
economic growth from material consumption and hence from its environmental
impacts. Figure 2 plots the changes of TMR per capita against growth of GDP per
capita for selected countries and mostly for a 20-year period (1975–1994). This is
to link (de)materialization of the respective  economies to their different economic
developments. TMR per capita seems to be levelling off for the industrialized
countries at about 80 tonnes per annum, except for Japan, at 40 tonnes, due to its
low energy consumption. Low TMR in Poland and China reflects these countries’
relatively low levels of economic development. Upward-pointing arrows indicate
that these (and probably other developing and transition countries) might well
catch up with the high-material-intensity economies of industrialized nations. In
general, while there seems to be some relative delinkage13 from growing GDP, all
these economies are still a far cry from dematerializing in absolute terms and by
the desirable sustainability standards of Factors 4 or 10.
                                                 
13
 Note that relative dematerialization, i.e. declining material intensity, expressed in TMR per
GDP could still permit an increase of total material use with growing GDP.
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Figure 2: Material use and economic growth in selected countries a)
Germany seems to be an exception. Recent numbers indicate an absolute decrease
(steep downward arrow) in TMR per capita from about 80 tonnes in the early
1990s to 72 tonnes in 1996. The main reason is the decrease of overburden
resulting from the closure of unprofitable lignite mines in the new States (neue
Länder) after the country’s reunification. Converging arrows of Germany and
West-Germany indicate that West-Germany’s production and consumption
patterns and concomitant constant material use might soon prevail.
Figure 3 shows the influence of reunification once more by the dotted-line jump
of TMR (1991/1992) from 4.5 to 7 billion tonnes. The figure also shows the huge
blow-up of material use (as the difference between direct material input, DMI, and
TMR) if hidden ‘ecological rucksacks’ are accounted for. Over time there seems
to be little difference in the development of DMI and TMR. Much of the hidden
flows consist of the rucksacks generated by production in other countries, whose
outputs were imported by Germany (Bringezu, 1997). At least part of Germany’s
economic growth seems thus to have been facilitated by importing sustainability,
possibly also from developing countries.
Source:  Wuppertal Institute, S.Bringezu, H. Schütz, 06/00.
Note:  a) China 1989-96, Finland 1975-94, Germany 1991-96, Japan 1975-94, Netherlands 1975-94, Poland 1992-97, USA 1975-94, West-Germany 1975-90.
           b) In 1990 prices and exchange rates.
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Figure 3: Material requirement, Germany 1975–96
Figure 3 also presents net additions to stock (NAS), hovering first below and then,
for unified Germany, at, one billion tonnes. NAS represent the materials stored in
durable goods such as buildings and infrastructure. Such accumulation of
materials in the economy can be interpreted as a measure of the — physical —
growth of the economy. On its own, just as its opposite, the wear and tear of
fixedassets, this accumulation cannot be kept up in the long term (Bringezu, 2000,
pp. 59-60). Daly (1996, p. 32) considers therefore a constant aggregate throughput
(where input equals output) as the defining feature of a “steady-state economy”.
Obviously such an economy would still have to specify normative limits to
throughput in order to attain ecological sustainability or dematerialization by a
certain Factor X.
The economic meaning of NAS is less clear. It reflects to some extent increasing
land use through built-up areas, though land use is probably better measured by
areal statistics. In principle, the indicator represents the physical counterpart of net
capital formation which has moved up more or less in line with GDP by about
10% (1991–1999, in constant prices) in unified Germany (Statistisches Bundes-
amt, 2000). The resulting scissor movement of NAS and capital formation can be
taken as a qualitative improvement of capital, resulting from technological
progress in capital productivity: capital goods seem to have received higher values
Source:  Wuppertal Institute, S. Bringezu, H. Schütz, 01/01. 
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(per tonne) in the markets because of their capability to increase output with the
same volume of capital goods. Again, conventional productivity analysis seems to
be more appropriate to assess technological progress.
4.2 Total capital value maintained: weak sustainability of a
growing economy
Productivity numbers can be quite misleading, however, if they do not take into
account, in their numerator, the reduction of bads, i.e. the successful reduction of
pollution, together with the goods of economic output. For instance, estimates of
the World Resources Institute showed that productivity of the electric utility
sector declined by about 0.38% annually but, corrected for emission reduction,
productivity actually rose by the same amount (Repetto, 2001, pp. 113/114).
Moreover, as described above, the neglect of natural capital consumption has
rendered the indicators of economic growth, net domestic product (NDP) and net
capital formation (NCF), misleading with regard to a nation’s long-term growth
potential. The additional costing of natural capital consumption and reinvestment
of this cost caters thus to the economic notion of sustainability. Upward trend of a
‘truly net’ (deducting environmental costs of natural capital consumption from
NDP) domestic product, i.e. EDP, would therefore indicate the environmental and
economic sustainability of economic growth.
Table 2 presents first estimates from a pilot SEEA study for Germany, prior to
(1990) and after (1991, 1995) unification. EDP estimates for three years (and
moreover in current prices) obviously cannot assess any trends in the
environmental sustainability of economic growth. Still, Table 2 shows a distinct
increase of environmental costs from about 60 billion DM (about 3% of NDP) in
1990 to 83 billion DM (3.3% of NDP) in 1991 because of the coverage of the new
States in 1991. Thereafter, adaptation of the new States to West-Germany’s
modern production methods appears to have removed the cost increase by 1995.
The table also identifies agriculture and energy supply as the most environmental-
cost-intensive industries (per unit of value added) — costs that consist largely of
pollution, since natural resource depletion is of little importance in Germany.
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Table 2: Environmental and green accounting indicators
(Germany 1990, 1991 and 1995)
(provisional estimates)
1990 1991 1995
Total
Agriculture,
fishery and
forestry
Iron and
steel
Energy
supply
NDP (billion DM) 1943 24.8 14.4 39.6 2527 3002
EDP (billion DM) 1884 16.6 11.7 26.3 2444 2926
EC/NDP (%) 3.0 33.4 18.9 33.6 3.3 2.5
NCF/NDP (%) 11.1 12.0 9.2
ECF/NDP (%) 8.1 8.7 6.7
Source: Bartelmus (2001b) and new calculations.
Explanations: EC = environmental cost of natural capital consumption; EDP = NDP-EC;
ECF = NCF-EC;
see Bartelmus (2001a) for details on the definition green accounting aggregates.
A more pertinent way of looking into the sustainability of economic performance
is to measure a nation’s ability to generate new capital after taking produced and
natural capital consumption into account. The adjusted capital formation indicator
(ECF) reflects such broadened capital consumption by deducting the value of
natural capital consumption from net capital formation. ECF remained positive,
albeit at lower levels than the conventional NCF indicator, indicating a net growth
in the overall value of (natural and produced) capital. Germany’s economic
performance during the few years covered can thus be considered ‘weakly’
sustainable, assuming that lost natural capital can be replaced by other produced,
human or renewable-natural capital categories. In case of complementarities, i.e.
use and abuse of irreplaceable (non-sustainable) natural assets, reinvestment cost
into compensating production and consumption activities, e.g. through evasion or
health expenditures within Germany or through import of sustainability, could be
much higher.
The good news is that the avoidance or immediate mitigation costs of
environmental impacts are relatively low at three per cent of net product; the bad
news is that actual and potential (future) damage from these impacts could be
considerably higher. As mentioned earlier, such damage cost are near-impossible
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to estimate at the national level. In fact, those brave enough to do so came up with
values ranging from about the same as our natural capital consumption value to
twenty times this value.14
In conclusion, from an ecological point of view, Germany’s has not been a
sustainable economy. Even if the economic point of view claims weak
sustainability, we have to consider that such sustainability carries the risk of —
hitherto unexplored — complementarities. It is a challenging task for
sustainability analyses to assess the existence and magnitude of such
complementarities for an economy, and not just for a few production and
consumption processes. First modelling exercises indicate that, under particular
assumptions, even ecological sustainability can be reached.15. Is Germany’s
economy sustainable? The answer is: hardly so in the past, but possibly in the
future (Bartelmus, 2001b, p. 33).
                                                 
14
 See for environmental damage estimates: (1) for Germany, Wicke (1993, pp. 60 et seq. and
114) and (2) for the EU, Markandya and Pavan (1999, p. 129).
15
 One such model is a dynamic input-output analysis which indicated, that – under quite
restrictive assumptions about production and consumption functions, price formation, and
social and ecological standards – Factor-10 sustainability can be attained in Germany, and
without major losses in economic growth (Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, 2000).
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5 Policy mix and partnership
The remaining question is, what do the obviously different notions and assess-
ments tell us for drawing strategic and policy conclusions?
Dematerialization strategies set physical standards to make the connection with
sustainability in economic growth and development. They envision the imminent
transgression of ultimate planetary limits, with irreparable damage to the
environment and increasing strife for natural resources. As a consequence, the
ecological (non)sustainability point of view conveys a sense of urgency for
tackling the environmental problem.
The goal of overall capital maintenance for ensuring continuing economic growth
does not deny the existence of environmental problems. It seeks, however, to
weigh environmental damage from, against economic benefits of, such growth.
‘Economic instruments’ are deemed to be the key for bringing about environ-
mentally sound production and consumption patterns. Optimism about the ability
of restrained market forces to find “optimal” solutions to trade-offs between
economic benefits and environmental quality characterizes the economic view of
sustainability.
The essential difference between the two strategic visions lies thus in the
evaluation of our closeness to environmental limits. Obviously this opens the field
to rhetoric and polemics until better and widely accepted empirical assessments
pave the way to consensus. In the meantime we should pursue both strategies,
determine heuristically a particular policy mix and monitor closely the sucesses or
failures of these policies.
A first step toward the implementation of physical dematerialization standards are
so-called ‘management rules’ for sustainable development (Daly, 1990). They
include
• lowering the scale of throughput to levels of natural carrying capacities
• use of renewable resources within regeneration rates
•  replacing, where possible, consumption of non-renewable resources by
equivalent renewable ones, and
• use of natural sinks within their absorptive and regenerative capacities.
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In practice, these generic rules have at least partially been translated by govern-
mental fiat into specific standards. Box 1 lists such standards for Germany’s
‘environmental barometer’, which is part of a draft national environmental policy
programme. It remains to be seen to what extent these standards will be
implemented by environmental regulation, which comes naturally to those
favouring ecological sustainability, or by more flexible policy instruments,
advocated by mainstream (environmental) economists.
Box 2: Environmental barometer Germany — indicators and targets
Climate:
• annual CO2 emission — 25% reduction of 1990-level by 2005
Air quality:
• emission of SO2, NOx, NH3 and VOCs — 70% of 1990-levels by 2010
Land use:
• increase of infrastructural use — reduction to 30 ha per day by 2020
• ecological priority area — safeguarding 10-15% of non-settled area by 2020
Water quality:
• adsorptive organic halogen compounds in rivers — <25µg/l by 2010
•  total N-loading — <3mg/l by 2010
Natural resources:
• GDP/primary energy consumption — doubling of 1990 level by 2020
• GDP/consumption of non-renewable resources — increase of 1993 level by
Factor 2.5 by 2020
Source: Bundesumweltministerium (1998), p. 33
Germany’s draft policy programme (proposed by the previous government) leans
toward the latter, i.e. towards voluntary agreements and market forces, reined in
by instruments of environmental cost internalization. Market intervention ought to
be minimized by allocating environmental costs to those who cause them. The
level and allocation of these costs to causing agents is left open as it is indeed
difficult to measure the physical environmental impacts and to value these
impacts as damages or avoidance — the very purpose of an integrated national
accounting system.
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In the absence of such accounting, and in fact opposition to compiling
environmentally-adjusted economic aggregates,16 market instruments are
generally set according to political exigencies. In Germany (and other European
countries) the result has been a heated discussion, accompanied by widespread
protests against an eco-tax which supposedly exceeded the ‘Schmerzgrenze’ (limit
of pain tolerance) for income losses. It is difficult to see, though, how one can
change production and consumption patterns without some painful incentive to do
so. Giving in to all kind of non-ecological pressures because of lack of factual
(quantitative) information may indeed change the purpose of a well-intended
environmental tax (see Box 3).
Box 3:  How ecological is Germany’s eco-tax?
• Tax rate differentiation and exemptions (notably for lignite) for the
consumption of different energy carriers caters to social and economic
objectives (financing social security, supporting regional economic growth)
rather than tackling emissions and their effects.
• Exemptions for high energy consumers distort the allocation of environmental
cost, at the expense of small-scale energy uses and users, and disregard
emission potentials of different energy carriers.
• Annual estimated eco-tax revenues of about 20-30 billion DM in the next few
years are way below the environmental cost estimates shown above. This
points to a massive underestimation of the necessary tax rate.
• There is no clear concept, apart from (mis)appropriation for economic and
social purposes, of tax revenue uses. Given the inherent underestimation of
environmental cost and time-lagged effects of cost internalization (facing
possible ‘irreversibilities’), their use in environmental protection can be
justified.
Faith in technology for increasing natural resource as well as natural capital
productivity provides some common ground between dematerialization and
capital maintenance strategies. Resource productivity focuses, however, on
material inputs (e.g. by trading material use certificates) whereas capital
maintenance tackles resource depletion and environmental degradation, in
particular by fiscal disincentives. It makes sense, indeed, to address sustainability
from both the input and the output sides. Care should be taken, however, that the
                                                 
16
 Notably by ‘official’ statisticians, e.g. Schöhr (2001, p. 40): “There won’t be a green GDP”.
Dematerialization and Capital Maintenance: Two Sides of the Sustainability Coin 27
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment, Energy
pliers of reducing material inputs and residual outputs do not cut off much needed
global economic development, e.g. by an exaggerated quest for self-sufficiency or
autarchy in natural resource use. A ‘cradle-to-grave’ management of production
and consumption processes has its undeniable benefits at the micro-level of
enterprises and households but might not necessarily apply at national or global
levels. Neither will technology alone be the saviour, especially if gains in resource
use and pollution are offset by increased consumption. As already mentioned,
eco-efficiency in production would have to be supplemented by some kind of
consumptive restraint.
As the eco-tax dispute shows, new production patterns and lifestyles cannot be
imposed single-handedly by governmental fiat, but require the collaboration of all
actors involved. Considering also that unfettered markets, as well as the above-
described accounting systems, are not capable of taking non-economic dimensions
of sustainability into account, the need for a political dialogue becomes evident.
This dialogue should include all shareholders, benefiting from economic activity,
and stakeholders, suffering from its environmental, social or cultural effects.
Germany’s Bündnis für Arbeit (Alliance for Work) between government,
corporations and trade unions looks like a model to be extended into the field of
environment.17 A Great Alliance for Sustainable Development could be the result
— great because it should cover all dimensions of sustainability and would also
provide a platform for achieving consensus, partnership and commitment among
all share- and stakeholders of economic development. The sustained implemen-
tation of sustainable development may depend on it.
                                                 
17
 A recent attempt at creating an ‘Alliance for Work and Environment’ (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
et al., 2000) is not very promising since it appears to exclude industry as a key economic
player, as well as other social consumer and stakeholder groups.
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